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Abstract 
This article aims to examine the leverage choice in a corporate spin-off with those of counterparts. The factors that 
determine the choice of leverage in a spin-off differ from those that influence leverage ratios in firms those were 
not subject of spin-off. The sample used in this study consists of completed spin-offs announced between 1992 
and 2016 in USA. The two competing capital structure theories-trade-off and pecking order are tested for the 
above-mentioned sample in this study. The results in this article are consistent with the predictions of the trade-
off theory and indicate that firms weigh the costs and benefits of debt when they make capital structure decisions. 
Empirical studies using year-end debt ratios of firms therefore distort the impact of the factors influencing leverage 
choice. This study avoids the problem faced by researchers when firms deviate from target leverage ratio by 
investigating the capital structure of a divested subsidiary in a spin-off.  
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1. Introduction 
Spin-offs provide a unique setting to examine capital structure choice because one observes the initial capital 
structure of a mature firm. Prior to this event, the subsidiary is unable to issue equity and relies on the parent to 
finance its capital investments. The subsidiary therefore has little if any debt and does not manage its capital 
structure. In a spin-off, the parent divides the assets of the firm and chooses the capital structure for the new, stand-
alone entity. Thus, the choice of leverage for the subsidiary is revealed. 
Unlike the firms in other capital structure studies, the subsidiary’s leverage ratio is its initial capital structure. 
The aim of this study is to investigate how firms determine their initial capital structure in a corporate spinoff. This 
motivation is similar to Alderson and Betker’s (1995) and Gilson’s (1997) examinations of the role of transaction 
and liquidation costs in the leverage choice of firms emerging from financial distress. Gilson finds that high 
transaction costs lead firms to retain more debt. Dittmar (2004) investigated how firms determine the capital 
structure of a subsidiary that is divested in a spinoff and found results supporting the predictions of the tradeoff 
theory of capital structure. But this study did not consider debt capacity assumption. Lemmon et al (2010) 
examined the impact of explicitly incorporating a measure of debt capacity in recent tests of competing theories 
of capital structure. They concluded that after accounting for debt capacity, the pecking order theory appears to 
give a good description of financing behavior for a large sample of firms examined over an extended time period.  
An extension of these two studies would be to compare capital structure theories (pecking order and tradeoff theory) 
empirically with debt capacity assumption for corporate spinoffs. This will provide valuable insight into which 
competing theories of capital structure work for corporate spinoffs and why and if these firms try to converge to a 
target leverage within next few years of divestiture. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Most of the previous analysis of capital structure examines firms’ leverage ratios. Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner 
(1989) discuss the problems that result from using leverage ratios to investigate how firms determine their capital 
structure. They model the impact of the cost to adjust leverage and explain how empirical tests that use year-end 
debt ratios are biased since observed leverage ratios depend on past operations. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
use simulations to investigate the impact of historical decisions on capital structure and show that the trade-off 
theory may appear to work because the serial correlation and cyclicality of earnings and capital expenditures 
induce mean reversion in firms’ debt ratios. This mean reversion can be misinterpreted as reversion to a target 
ratio. If firms choose an optimal leverage ratio, then firm characteristics will determine leverage choice. The 
relations between firm characteristics and leverage are more easily detectable in the spinoff sample because the 
leverage ratios do not evolve from prior operating histories but rather are chosen.  
The results from Dittmar (2004) study indicate that firms make strategic capital structure decisions and imply 
that size, growth, and collateral value influence debt choice. However, profitability, which is strongly significant 
in other studies, does not influence the choice of debt. Thus, the factors that cause the negative relation do not 
influence the spun off subsidiaries’ capital structure decisions. If profits are correlated with growth opportunities 
that are not captured by other measures of growth, then this negative relation is consistent with the trade-off theory. 
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Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) also provide evidence that sample firms largely act to fund their financing 
deficits with debt and conclude that the pecking order theory provides a good first-order approximation of their 
financing behavior. Consistent with this view, Fama and French (2002) report that short-term variation in earnings 
and investment is mostly absorbed by debt. In contrast, Frank and Goyal (2003) show that Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers' empirical findings supporting the pecking order theory do not survive when a broader sample of firms or a 
longer time series is used, while Chirinko and Singha (2000) argue that the empirical test used by Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers has little power to distinguish among alternative financing schemes. 
Lemmon et al (2010) modified the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) test by accounting for heterogeneity in 
the level of debt capacity across firms and show that when firms must seek external funding, those most likely to 
be unconstrained by concerns over debt capacity primarily use debt to fill their financing deficits, while those firms 
with limited debt capacity exhibit a heavy reliance on external equity financing. Lemmon et al (2010) showed that 
it is precisely the small, high-growth firms that also face the most restrictive debt capacity constraints. Overall, the 
evidence suggests that the frequent equity issues by young, high-growth firms are consistent with the existence of 
debt capacity constraints and do not contradict a version of the pecking order that recognizes limits to the use of 
debt financing. 
Bolton and Freixas (2000), in a model that is very closely related to the theory underlying the pecking order, 
provide an empirically implementable description of debt capacity. They present a model of financing choice in 
which the main friction is asymmetric information between the firm and the market. Bolton and Freixas also 
suggest measures of firm risk or firm age as alternative proxies for debt capacity. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) 
also provide a model in which the presence or absence of public or rated debt is related to the firm's level of debt 
capacity. In their model, a firm's debt capacity is determined by its available collateral. Holmstrom and Tirole 
point out that a firm's debt capacity may be driven by demand- and/or supply-side considerations. Consistent with 
a firm's use of public debt as an indication of debt capacity, Whited (1992), Carpenter, Fazzari, and Peterson (1998), 
Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), and many others have used the existence of a bond rating as an 
empirical measure of whether firms face financing constraints in the external financial markets. 
 
3. Development of Hypothesis 
Historical operating and financial decisions influence these ratios. For instance, a string of unexpectedly high (low) 
profits will push leverage below (above) the target leverage ratio. If firms continuously adjust their capital structure, 
they will immediately correct these deviations. However, if transaction costs or market conditions prevent quick 
movements back to the target, firms will at least temporarily deviate from their target leverage ratio. This 
temporary deviation may induce a negative relation between leverage and profit. Numerous papers on capital 
structure document that leverage and profit are negatively correlated. If profits are correlated with growth 
opportunities that are not captured by other measures of growth, then this negative relation is consistent with the 
trade-off theory. However, if growth does not induce the negative relation between profits and leverage, then the 
trade-off theory cannot explain this relation. 
Dittmar (2004) found that the average debt to value of the subsidiaries is significantly lower than that of their 
pre- and post-spin-off parents. The subsidiaries’ and the pre and post-spin-off parent’s leverage ratios are higher 
than those of their industry. Thus, the firm chooses a lower leverage ratio for the subsidiary. These results imply 
that the previously documented negative relation between leverage and profit derives from distortions in firms’ 
leverage ratios that occur over time rather than from a true economic choice. From the above discussion, the 
hypotheses can be stated as: 
H1. Leverage is negatively associated with profitability in corporate spinoffs. (Test of pecking order) 
H2. Spinoff firms have an optimal or target capital structure and they lever the firm to coincide with this 
target. (Test of trade off theory) 
 
4. Sample Construction 
A spin-off is a pro rata distribution of the stock of a subsidiary to existing shareholders. The subsidiary may be an 
existing division or a newly created subsidiary of the parent. At the time of the spin-off, the subsidiary becomes a 
freestanding company. No funds are raised in a spin-off, and neither firm revalues its assets. Under Internal 
Revenue Code section 355, a spin-off is considered a tax-exempt distribution if after the spin-off the parent retains 
no more than a 20% interest in the voting power of all classes of voting stock and no more than a 20% interest in 
each class of nonvoting stock. In addition, the distribution may not be executed as a means of distributing dividends 
to the stockholders, and both corporations must be engaged in active business after the spin-off and for 5 years 
preceding the spin-off. Due to the strong tax incentive, most spin-offs involve the near-complete divestiture of the 
subsidiary. Thus, the parent allocates the assets and liabilities to a freestanding company.  
The sample used in this study consists of completed spin-offs announced between 1992 and 2016, collected 
from SDC platinum and then data for these are collected from WRDS database. The accounting data for the firms 
are collected from Compustat. It is possible for firms to spin off a subsidiary in two stages, where first a portion 
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of the subsidiary is carved out and then the rest of the shares are distributed tax-free to shareholders of the parent 
company. The characteristics of this subsample may differ from the rest of the sample because the subsidiary is 
publicly traded with access to equity markets before the spin-off and the inflow of cash from the carve-out may 
alter the capital structure.  
 
5.Variable Measurement 
The main variables used include the following.  
Collateral: the ratio of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) to total assets.  
The market-to-book (MB) ratio: Book value/Market value  
Profitability (ROA): the ratio of operating profits to total assets.  
Firm age and Firm Characteristics Variables 
All these are collected from Compustat. 
 
6.Research Design 
Predicted Leverage ratios: 
Debt/Value-E(Debt/Value) = α + β1ln(Assets)+β2(Growth Opportunities)+β3(ROA)+β4[(Inventory +PPE) /Assets] 
 
7.Results 
Descriptives: 
Year Announced Spin-offs (No.) (declared) Occurred Spin-offs (No.) (effective) 
1992 22 12 
1993 26 25 
1994 30 27 
1995 49 42 
1996 38 45 
1997 43 38 
1998 46 49 
1999 36 36 
2000 43 34 
2001 17 30 
2002 19 25 
2003 26 18 
2004 16 19 
2005 15 17 
2006 14 13 
2007 27 22 
2008 18 26 
2009 9 9 
2010 10 11 
2011 22 14 
2012 18 18 
2013 33 21 
2014 37 36 
2015 19 30 
2016 5 21 
Table 1: Spin-off Sample by Year 
Table 1 lists the sample by the year in which the spin-off is announced and the year in which the spin-off 
occurred. Sample observations are dispersed evenly throughout the sample period.  
Target Firm Status Frequency Percent 
Joint Venture 3 0.47 
Private 6 0.94 
Public 100 15.67 
Subsidiary 529 82.92 
Table 2: Target Status 
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The status of the target firm are listed in table 2. 
Range % Owned After Transaction 
0-10% 0.47 
>20% 0.95 
>40% 2.37 
>60% 6.62 
>80% 11.04 
100% 78.71 
Table 3: % of shares owned after transaction 
The proportion of shares owned by parent after a spin-off transaction are listed in table 3. 
 Spinoff year After spinoff 
Total Debt/Equity Mean 8.01 6.76 
Total Debt/Total Assets Mean 0.66 0.66 
Total Debt/Capital Mean 0.506 0.61 
Total Debt/Invested Capital Mean .812 0.81 
Long-term Debt/Invested Capital Mean 1.66 0.65 
Long-term Debt/Book Equity Mean 1.19 1.25 
Interest coverage -0.25 -.301 
Interest coverage ratio 18.45 18.26 
Table 4: Leverage ratios in event year and after 
 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Total Debt/Equity 2.97 2.0 3.30 2.91 2.39 
Total Debt/Total Assets 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.60 
Total Debt/Capital 0.46 0.47 0.53 0.53 0.37 
Total Debt/Invested Capital 0.55 0.50 0.57 0.31 0.48 
Long-term Debt/Invested Capital 0.37 0.36 0.41 0.28 0.35 
Long-term Debt/Book Equity 0.99 1.08 1.11 1..00 1.11 
Table 5: Leverage Ratios for Subsidiaries in subsequent years 
 
Regression Analysis: 
  Leverage ratios 
Ln (Assets)(Size) 0.03 
(.13) 
    0.02 
(.35) 
.03 
(.30) 
R&D/Sales (Growth)  -.15 
(.02) 
   -.19 
(.04) 
-.17 
(.05) 
M/B ratio   -0.02 
(.51) 
   -0.02 
(.79) 
ROA    0.05 
(.14) 
 -0.02 
(.83) 
-0.04 
(.45) 
Collateral     0.29 
(.01) 
0.27 
(.03) 
.17 
(.13) 
Intercept .18 
(.01) 
.26 
(.02) 
.27 
(.02) 
.26 
(.02) 
.26 
(.01) 
.11 
(.15) 
.09 
(.25) 
No. of observations 380 380 373 380 355 345 315 
Table 6: Spinoff firm’s capital structure levels: Leverage ratios 
Table 6 presents the results of estimating model using the leverage ratio as the dependent variable. The results 
show that growth, as measured by the ratio of R&D to sales, and the collateral value of assets, as measured by the 
ratio of inventory and PP&E to assets, significantly influence the choice of debt. A one standard deviation increase 
in growth results in a 15% decrease in the book leverage ratio chosen by the subsidiary. A one standard deviation 
increase in relative collateral value of assets results in an 29% increase in the book leverage ratio chosen by the 
subsidiary. Thus, these variables are both statistically and economically significant. The market to book ratio is 
insignificant. This result is surprising given the significance of R&D/sales and the results of other studies. The 
insignificance of the coefficient on market to book may be due to the volatility of the ratio discussed in the previous 
section or the subsidiaries’ market to book ratios may not accurately account for the firms’ growth opportunities. 
Cusatis et al. (1993) and Desai and Jain (1999) show that a portfolio of spun-off subsidiaries significantly 
outperforms a portfolio of size- and industry-matched firms over the 3 years following the event. Thus, the market 
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value shortly after the spin-off may not fully reflect firm value or growth opportunities.  
Predicted Leverage ratio: Debt/Value-E(Debt/Value) = α + β1ln(Assets) + β2(Growth Opportunities) + β3(ROA) + 
β4[(Inventory + PPE)/Assets] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Size (ln Assets) 0.03 
(.21) 
     
R&D/Sales  -.30 
(.01) 
    
M/B ratio   -.06 
(.12) 
   
ROA    .55 
(.01) 
  
Collateral     .15 
(.81) 
 
Intercept .51 -0.02 -0.04 -.08 -.08 -.31 
No of Obs 310 310 310 310 310 310 
R square .22 .06 .02 .05 .35 .37 
Table 7: Analysis of Differences in Subsidiaries actual and Predicted leverage ratio 
where the time is the year of the spin-off, E indicates the predicted leverage ratio, and value is the book value of 
assets. Thus, the coefficients represent difference in the subsidiaries’ and predicted leverage ratios. The results, 
presented in table 7, are striking and illustrate the difference in the factors influencing nonsample firms’ leverage 
ratios and the choice of initial leverage in a spin-off. Relative leverage ratios are positively related to profits. This 
finding contrasts with the results in other studies that show a negative relation between leverage and profit and 
further indicates that the inverse relation between leverage and profitability occurs only in nonsample firms that 
have operating histories. The result continues to hold when market to book ratios are used to control for growth 
opportunities, indicating that the difference in the relation does not stem from the correlation between growth and 
profit. This result implies that the negative relation between leverage and profits derives from the influence 
operating histories have on the leverage ratios. The coefficients on all other firm characteristics are insignificant, 
indicating that their influence on the subsidiaries’ leverage ratios is not significantly different than their influence 
for all firms. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The subsidiaries are supposed to have lower leverage ratios if they are small with high growth opportunities. 
However, when the subsidiaries are large and have higher collateral value, they have higher leverage ratios. The 
leverage ratio chosen for the subsidiaries may be insignificantly different from their predicted leverage ratios. The 
factors that determine the choice of leverage in a spin-off differ from those that influence nonsample firms’ 
leverage ratios. Growth and collateral value may have significant influence in leverage choice. High growth firms 
choose lower leverage ratios, and firms with high collateral value choose higher leverage ratios. 
The test of competing theories would be interesting to explore in a sample of spinoff firms. If tradeoff theory 
or pecking order work for the sample firms, but not for the parent firms, then there is important implications for 
the results. 
Despite extensive investigations into how firms determine their capital structures, the capital structure puzzle 
prevails. One of the difficulties researchers face in these studies is that a firm may deviate from its target leverage 
ratio. These deviations arise because operating and financial decisions push leverage above or below the firm’s 
target and transaction costs and market conditions may prevent immediate corrections. Empirical studies using 
year-end debt ratios of firms therefore distort the impact of the factors influencing leverage choice. This study 
avoids these problems by investigating the capital structure of a divested subsidiary in a spin-off. In a spin-off, the 
firm allocates assets and chooses a capital structure for the newly formed, stand-alone subsidiary. 
Prior to this event, the subsidiary exists but does not have an individual capital structure. Thus, the leverage 
ratio used in this article is the initial leverage for the firm. Firms make systematic leverage choices and allocate 
debt based on firm characteristics. These results support the predictions of the trade-off theory. Specifically, 
growth is negatively related and collateral value is positively related to leverage choice. Further, profitability is 
not inversely related to leverage choice and is positively related to the difference in a firm’s actual and predicted 
leverage ratio. This finding contrasts with the findings of many other capital structure studies that find a negative 
relation between profit and nonsample firms’ leverage ratios. This negative relation is typically attributed either to 
growth or to factors that cause a firm to deviate from its target capital structure. Once growth is controlled for, any 
negative relation that remains between leverage and profits contradicts the trade-off theory. Conversely, the results 
in this article are consistent with the predictions of the trade-off theory and indicate that firms weigh the costs and 
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benefits of debt when they make capital structure decisions. This article focuses on the initial leverage choice in a 
corporate spin-off and how these leverage ratios compare to nonsample firms.  
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